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Abstract—Cyberattackers often use the Domain Name System
(DNS) in their activities. Botnet C&C servers and phishing
websites both use DNS to facilitate connection to or from its
victims, while the protocol in its basic form does not contain
any security countermeasures to thwart such behavior. In this
paper, we examine capabilities of a DNS firewall that would
be able to filter access from the protected network to known
malicious domains on the outside network. Considering the needs
of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), we
formulated functional requirements that a DNS firewall should
fulfill to fit the role of a cybersecurity tool. Starting from these
requirements, we developed a DNS firewall based on the DNS
Response Policy Zones technology, the only suitable open source
technology available yet. However, we encountered several essen-
tial limitations in the DNS RPZ technology during the testing
period. Still, our testing results show that simple DNS firewall
can prevent attacks not detected by other cybersecurity tools.
We discuss the limitations and propose possible solutions so that
the DNS firewall might be used as a more complex cybersecurity
tool in the future. Lessons learned from the deployment show
that while the DNS firewall can indeed be used to block access
to malicious domains, it cannot yet satisfy all the requirements
of cybersecurity teams.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) is being widely taken
advantage of by various cyberattackers for years now. With
no level of security control, the DNS translates a known
malicious domain when queried as well as a benign one. The
attackers are aware of it and use domain names as aliases for
their Command and Control (C&C) servers. In these cases,
simple blocking of attacker’s IP address is not enough, as the
attackers have techniques that allow them to rapidly change IP
addresses while their domain name remains the same. These
techniques render IP blocking ineffective [1]. Similar cases
when DNS unsuspectingly translates a malicious domain name
happen during phishing campaigns that employ typo-squatting
technique when attackers register domain names similar to
well known and trusted domains in an attempt to create a false
sense of security in their victims [2]. A promising adaptation
to this behavior would be an intelligent local DNS resolver,
a DNS firewall, able to distinguish whether a malicious or a
benign domain is being translated and to prevent potentially
harmful connections.
Aside from the cybersecurity issues the DNS firewall would
help to solve, its deployment might also be driven by the need
to fulfill legal requirements. In this role, the DNS firewall
poses as a de facto form of Internet censorship [3]. On the
one hand, there are countries with authoritarian governments
such as China, North Korea, Iran, etc. which implement DNS
blocking to block websites belonging to their political oppo-
sition, independent media, etc. On the other hand, there are
non-authoritarian countries which also have motives for using
DNS filtering. Rationales of these countries can be blocking
of obscene content, defamation, harassment, state security
concerns, or intellectual property protection. For example,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the Czech Republic are
obliged to block websites providing non-permitted Internet
gambling according to the Act On Gambling [4].
In this paper, we focus on technological aspects of this
measure, having in mind that a DNS firewall must also provide
supplementary functions like management access and auditing
to fit among other cybersecurity tools. In cooperation with
our cybersecurity incident handlers, we formulated functional
requirements that the DNS firewall should fulfill. These re-
quirements should cover the needs of any Computer Security
Incident Response Team (CSIRT):
• Domain Blocking – The DNS firewall must be able
to block translation of blacklisted malicious domains.
The blocking of domain translation effectively disrupts
C&C infrastructure of botnets and prevents users from
interacting with malicious websites. It should also provide
a management interface for easy access and configuration.
• User Notifying – When users try to interact with a
blocked domain, it is not sufficient to just block the
DNS translation. The users should be informed about
why the domain is blocked but contacting them outside
of the DNS firewall system is often not a trivial task.
The DNS firewall could immediately redirect them to an
informational landing page, so the DNS filtering remains
transparent and educates users to be more careful in the
future.
• Event Logging – The DNS firewall must be able to log
attempts to access blacklisted domains. Analysis of this
log allows detecting anomalies that might indicate an
attack or misconfiguration in the local network.
• Domain Blacklist Sharing – Similarly to fast IP switch-
ing, the attackers can quickly change domain names of
their servers. If every DNS firewall acted separately,
the reaction window would be too large for efficient
attack prevention. To minimize the size of this window,
organizations using DNS firewall should either share their
blacklist or subscribe to updates from a central authority.
We designed a DNS firewall system based on the above
requirements, using the only open source technology currently
available – DNS Response Policy Zones (DNS RPZ) [5].
We tested the firewall in both isolated environment and real
network traffic on our campus network. We discovered that the
DNS RPZ technology suffers from serious limitations during
our testing, most of them arising from the fact that DNS RPZ
uses techniques similar to DNS session hijacking. We have
recently deployed a DNS firewall that fulfills the requirements
of domain blocking, event logging and partly user informing,
but fails in blacklist sharing. The data we gathered so far shows
that the DNS firewall complements other cybersecurity tools
and detects anomalies that would otherwise be overlooked. We
present the limitations we identified and propose our solutions
to promote discussion on the topic. We believe that if these
issues are resolved, the DNS firewall will prove a valuable
tool in the field of cyberattack prevention.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
mentions other works and projects concerning DNS filtering.
Section III describes the specifications of the DNS RPZ
technology. Section IV describes our implementation of DNS
firewall for the Cybersecurity Incident Response Team of
Masaryk University (CSIRT-MU). Section V highlights the
open issues of current DNS firewall technology we encoun-
tered and Section VI concludes with lessons learned.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea to use the DNS filtering to combat online threats
comes from a blog post in 2010 by one of the authors of
the DNS, Paul Vixie [6]. Vixie claimed that most of the
newly registered domain names at the time were malicious and
proposed an open source technology for domain blacklisting
called DNS Response Policy Zones.
The DNS RPZ is currently the only existing open source
technology for DNS firewalls usable on the institutional level.
Only a handful of papers was published in this area over the
last seven years. A case study was conducted in 2012, exam-
ining the impact of DNS RPZ on network traffic security [7].
In 2013, a technical report was published by Connery [8],
containing information on how to correctly implement DNS
RPZ as a security measure and join the DNS RPZ community.
Another report was published by Connery [9] in the same year,
providing an overview of the DNS RPZ and demonstrating
several use-cases. This report also described possible future
directions of DNS RPZ technology development.
Approximately at the same time as the DNS firewall was
being considered as a cybersecurity tool, the discussion began
about the usage of DNS filtering to block domains that host
content infringing on intellectual property rights. Crocker et
al. argue that state-wide enforced DNS filtering would be easy
to circumvent, might cause collateral damages, and that it is
not compatible with the authenticated and secure version of
DNS – DNSSEC [10]. French top-level domain name operator
Afnic confirms the relevance of these arguments in their own
report [11]. We believe that most of these issues can be solved
when the DNS firewall is used on a smaller scale, e. g. in
Fig. 1. Standard query processing in DNS
an organization. The circumvention problem might be tackled
by transparent blocking of exclusively malicious targets while
informing users about the potential risks and giving them no
incentive to opt out.
To reliably block only malicious domains, they should be
either checked manually, or an accurate automatic procedure
could be employed. Research is being done in the field of
timely automatic recognition of malicious domain names.
Prakash et al. propose an algorithm for predictive generation
of malicious URLs used in phishing campaigns [12]. Proactive
blacklisting of malicious domain names is also the topic of a
study conducted by Felegyhazi et al. [13]
III. DNS RPZ TECHNOLOGY
The DNS RPZ technology may be considered a de facto
standard for exerting control over DNS communication for
the cybersecurity cause. It was designed by Paul Vixie, one of
the people behind the DNS protocol itself. The technology is
defined in an RFC draft where last changes were committed in
June 2018 [5]. It is implemented in the widely used Berkeley
Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS server since version 9.8,
so it can be set up on any BIND-based open source DNS
resolver. Beside open source applications, the DNS RPZ is also
used in several commercial DNS firewalls as well. For example
in BlueCat DNS [14], and DNS firewall by InfoBlox [15].
The DNS RPZ blacklist corresponds to a DNS zone file
commonly used in BIND. The rules contained therein are
written in the form of zone file entries. However, the DNS
RPZ defines its specific keywords in two categories – actions
and triggers. Each rule consists of exactly one action and
one trigger. For example, a DNS RPZ rule might have the
following syntax:
malicious.domain.com IN CNAME rpz-drop.
Where malicious.domain.com is the trigger, rpz-drop. is
the action, and IN and CNAME are regular DNS zone file
parameters. When processing a query, the DNS RPZ sequen-
tially goes through all the rules in its blacklist. If a matching
trigger is found, a firewall action triggers, otherwise the DNS
communication is not tampered with. The difference of how
a query is handled in DNS and DNS RPZ is illustrated on
Figures 1 and 2, where the DNS RPZ provides a modified
reply to redirect user on a safe page.
Fig. 2. Query processing in the DNS RPZ
The DNS RPZ technology defines five triggers that may
invoke a rule based on different conditions:
• QNAME Trigger – It is based on the name of the queried
domain. Allows the usage of a wildcard character to be
applied to all subdomains.
• IP Trigger – Checks the content of a DNS reply for the
returned IP address. If the returned IP address is present
on the blacklist, the rule applies.
• CLIENT IP Trigger – The rule applies if the IP address
of the querying DNS client is present on the blacklist.
• NSDNAME Trigger – This trigger allows issuing a
modified DNS reply if the domain name of the delegated
DNS server is present on the blacklist.
• NSIP Trigger – This trigger allows issuing a modified
DNS reply if the IP address of the delegated DNS server
is present on the blacklist.
The DNS RPZ defines six following actions that alter the
DNS reply in different ways.
• NXDOMAIN – Blocks the communication. The client is
returned a reply that the queried domain name does not
exist.
• NODATA – Blocks the communication. The client is
returned a reply that the queried domain name exists,
but its IP address is not contained in the reply.
• PASSTHRU – Allows the communication as in standard
DNS, but creates a log entry in the DNS firewall log.
• DROP – Blocks the communication. Both the query and
the reply are discarded. The user gets no answer besides
connection timeout.
• TCP-Only – Requires the client to resend the usual UDP
DNS query over TCP. It is designed to mitigate the impact
of DDoS attacks on DNS RPZ servers.
• Local Data – Redirects the communication. The com-
munication is redirected to a specified domain name or
IP address.
The above-specified triggers and actions may be mixed into
specific rules. The action segment of the rule allows to either
block the client connection or redirect it on a different server.
The PASSTHRU action is reserved for special exceptions that
should be let through regardless of whether they appear later
on the blacklist. This way, a rule can be created that enables
access to secure.example.com while example.com and all of
its other subdomains remain blocked. It is also useful for
whitelisting critical domains so that they can’t be blocked by
mistake in the future.
The triggers provide much variability in rule construction.
Aside from blocking access to malicious domains, they allow
blocking all DNS queries from a specific client device or
discard DNS replies from a malicious outside DNS server.
By using CLIENT IP Trigger, we can redirect all DNS
queries from an infected device on an internal network to a
landing page with instructions on how to proceed to purge the
infection. This way, infected devices can be easily quarantined.
By cutting DNS connection, they get isolated from attacker’s
C&C servers and are unable to cause further mischief [6].
NSDNAME and NSIP provide means to block replies from
specific external DNS servers. However, caution needs to be
exercised when blocking a DNS server. Authoritative name-
servers usually translate more than one domain. If an authorita-
tive DNS server is blocked, all the domains it manages will be
inaccessible. If the block is a false positive, significant damage
to traffic on the protected network may be caused.
If the DNS firewall blacklist is constructed manually, the
probability of false positives is not high, as each entry might
be manually examined. However, such procedure is highly
inefficient and requires constant work. The DNS RPZ contains
a method for blacklist sharing, so any malicious domain
identified by one organization can be shared with others. The
sharing method uses existing protocol for Incremental Zone
Transfer (IXFR), as DNS RPZ blacklist behaves as a DNS
zone file. The sharing system is designed so that the regular
blacklist consumers would subscribe to several large producers
while sustaining and sharing their own private blacklist [16].
IV. DNS FIREWALL IMPLEMENTATION
Starting from the requirements on DNS firewall we identi-
fied, we have designed and deployed the DNS firewall on a
large-scale campus network.
A. Module Implementation
The DNS RPZ provides only the means to block access to
malicious domains. Most importantly, it lacks any adminis-
trative interface. This means that any configuration must be
initially done directly, by accessing blacklist files and editing
the rules. We implemented several modules to support DNS
RPZ firewall – administrative GUI with remote access to
firewall blacklist, logging module and a landing page to serve
as a target for user redirection.
Our DNS firewall system has a single main purpose –
blocking access to known malicious domains. We decided
that we will only use user redirection as opposed to simple
domain blocking. When operating a DNS firewall for a large
network with tens of thousands of users, the efficiency of
simple blocking is limited if the blocked domain is accessed
directly by users through the web browser. With no way of
knowing the cause of the domain suddenly being unavailable,
users would search for other ways to access it or generate
tickets for their helpdesk [11]. We believe that redirecting
Fig. 3. Query processing in the DNS RPZ with a management interface and
a logging module.
users is a much better approach. We designed a secure landing
page that presents the user with information about the security
incident that just occurred and a course of action to appeal for
lifting the block. It should be mentioned that the landing page
server can only answer users visiting it over HTTP or HTTPS.
If the user initiated a connection over other protocol, it is
refused and the redirection works similarly to simple domain
blocking.
To maintain the awareness of the DNS firewall operation, we
implemented an event logging system. Every attempt at access-
ing a blocked domain is logged through the firewall connector
into incident handling system. Similarly, all administrative
actions taken in the firewall are logged. This way, our handlers
have all relevant information at hand if any users decide to
contact them concerning specific security incident. Retroactive
or even-real time log analysis is also possible. The analysis
might point to anomalies that will need to be interpreted. These
anomalies encompass infected devices trying to contact their
C&C servers, users that fell victim to phishing campaigns and
similar incidents. Currently, there are attempts at DNS RPZ log
interpretation [17], but further research in anomaly detection
will be required.
To more concisely demonstrate our DNS firewall operation,
we present an example of DNS query processing in Figure 3.
In this example, the client sends a standard query to the DNS
server. However, the domain name in the query is malicious
and is listed on the DNS firewall blacklist. The DNS server
logs this communication attempt and responds with a modified
DNS reply. The client is then redirected to a landing page,
where the original domain name is displayed along with the
reason of why it was blocked together with a contact form to
the security team. In this case, the user chooses to complain
to the handlers and requests to lift the block. The request is
automatically sent from the web server to the incident handling
system, where the handlers manually verify this claim. If they
evaluate the domain to be benign, they unblock it through API
directly on the DNS server.
B. Firewall Deployment
We have created a prototype of the system and deployed it
on our campus network for several rounds of testing. All of
the key system parts were implemented and interconnected –
a DNS RPZ firewall with an API for remote access, adminis-
trative GUI with log processing module and a webserver with
a firewall landing page.
First, we ran a test to estimate the importance of the
DNS firewall on a large scale network. For this purpose, the
firewall was temporarily set to only log accesses to blacklisted
domains without blocking them. Our campus network is a
quickly changing environment with around 43 000 static and
mobile devices. We manually created a blacklist of 38 known
malicious domains that figured in security incidents in our
network during January 2018. The incidents were detected
by a proprietary anomaly detection system deployed in our
infrastructure and we analyzed the traffic to discover the target
domains. Since all the domains were manually examined, it is
safe to assume the blacklist did not contain any false positives.
We fitted our DNS firewall with the blacklist and logged
events on our network for one month since 12th of February to
12th of March 2018. During this period, the firewall detected
217 accesses to the blacklisted domains by 23 distinct IP
addresses. We believe that this number is high enough to
affirm the importance of the use of DNS firewall along other
cyberattack countermeasures.
After the initial importance test, the prototype entered
another testing stage. The DNS firewall was tested for imple-
mentation faults in an isolated environment. When we finished
testing of the modules and their interconnection, we switched
to testing of various scenarios for chosen groups of users
and firewall administrators. Finally, we deployed the prototype
on our main DNS resolvers for the whole campus network.
Unfortunately, we encountered a major limitation of the DNS
RPZ in the final firewall testing stage. If users browse websites
over HTTPS, it is impossible to redirect them to the landing
page as the browser identifies it as an attack attempt. This
is still an open issue and it is more closely described in
Section V.
Until this issue is resolved, the DNS RPZ-based firewall is
restricted only to simple domain blocking, and users must be
informed of the fact using other channels. We are currently
using our web pages to display the list of blocked domains
for regular users and local network administrators. We are
also considering the possibility of sending e-mails to users
that attempted to access a blocked domain. The e-mail can
contain all the information formerly accessible through the
landing page. However, both these processes are not ideal and
come with a caveat. We believe that the direct link between
the attempted access and the reason for blocking, which was
provided by user redirection, is now too loose.
Another issue arose with the implementation of the blacklist
sharing function. Several commercial subjects exist, that pro-
vide their DNS RPZ blacklists in a paid subscription model,
often along with other security services. However, this model
is not feasible for CSIRTs that develop and rely on their own
security tools. Besides subscribing to a paid service, it is also
possible to subscribe to a generic and sometimes free domain
blacklist, that can be converted into a DNS RPZ blacklist. The
quality of such data is unfortunately often bad, which, in case
of the DNS firewall, would result in a lot of needlessly blocked
connections. As a result, this function was ultimately left out
of our firewall. Even though we are still prepared to share our
manually updated blacklist with others with similar interest.
V. OPEN ISSUES
During the implementation and testing of the DNS RPZ
system, we have identified several issues that limit its practical
usage. In this section, we present those issues and outline
directions for future development that could help in solving
them.
A. HTTPS Usage
The most significant issue with DNS RPZ is that it cannot
redirect users when SSL/TLS is in use. The goal of the DNS
firewall on web traffic is to inform users about their attempts
to visit malicious or blocked domains, and to explain to them
why those domains are dangerous. DNS RPZ works well when
a simple HTTP is in use. It simply provides the user with an
IP address of our server which serves the informative page for
each request. However, this approach fails with HTTPS.
The users’ web browser does not know about DNS redi-
rection before contacting the target server. It assumes the
IP address provided by the DNS system is valid and pro-
ceeds with standard SSL/TLS handshake. It specifies desired
domain in Client hello message field SNI (Server Name
Indication). The server then responds with Server hello mes-
sage, where it needs to send the server certificate with a
public key to establish the secure connection. However, it
is impossible for the server to have a valid certificate for
the blocked domain (by the design of certificate authority
system), so the server includes a default certificate in the re-
sponse. The browser then verifies the certificate and ends with
name mismatch error, often displayed as ssl bad cert domain
or ERR CERT COMMON NAME INVALID together with a
warning that someone is trying to impersonate the server. The
user has to approve security exception to access the explana-
tion page which is not the behavior we want to encourage in
users. Another option for the server is to issue a self-signed
certificate for each blocked domain, but the result of certificate
verification would be virtually the same, only with a different
error message.
The impact of this limitation will grow even more serious
in the future with the concepts of HTTPS-by-default being
introduced in major web browsers. A global solution would
be a new type of certificates that would be issued for the sole
purpose of domain blocking. Upon receiving such certificate,
the browser would display a warning that the domain was
blocked by the DNS service provider and would display a
text message from the server with a detailed explanation why
the domain was blocked. As this is a proposal of the future
solution, the implementation details are open for discussion,
but we assume that it is feasible to issue a certificate (or
extended validation certificate) for company sub-domain in the
form of domainblock.company.com which does not require any
changes in current CA system. However, the browsers will
have to implement a check for domainblock sub-domain to
display the warning page. Another implementation problem
would be showing the block reason so as not to be exploitable
by external content loaded into a page with a valid certificate
for any requested SNI. The browsers could restrict the message
to plain text, or a new HTML meta tag could be introduced
to list blocking reasons, and the server would only send the
reason number to be translated into a message by the browser.
The cleanest solution would be to modify the DNS proto-
col itself. When creating the response, the DNS server can
use response code 5 – Refused [18] to indicate the request
violates organization policies. However, the reason for domain
blocking is still missing, and the response body would need to
include text message explaining the block reason in a form that
the receiving application could display to the user. The DNS
protocol should specify the message format so that vendors can
implement it. Furthermore, the DNS RPZ technology should
adopt this response code as an option for domain blocking.
B. Domain Blacklist Sharing
We identified two main issues with the DNS firewall
blacklist sharing. The most important issue is caused by the
relatively small community and general reluctance to share
the data. Currently, there are no organizations sharing their
blacklists that we know of. The only remaining option to keep
the blacklist up-to-date automatically being a paid subscription
to a provider like FarsightSecurity [19], InfoBlox [15] or
SpamHaus [20]. The blacklist sharing may be set up rather
easily using the existing protocol for incremental DNS zone
transfer (IXFR) and we are prepared to share our blacklist
with other institutions implementing their DNS firewall.
Another significant issue comes from the trustworthiness
of shared blacklist. A false positive domain on the blacklist,
i.e., a legitimate domain which is on the blacklist by mistake,
in an intrusion detection system can produce (in the worst
case scenario) a flood of detections that will overwhelm the
administrators. However, in the case of DNS RPZ, a false
positive domain can lead to disruption of organization services
as the domain is automatically blocked by the system. This
problem is prominent especially in the field of phishing web
pages which are often hosted on free hosting or exploit
a misconfiguration of a legitimate page. Blocking on the
level of the domain is then problematic as domains such as
forms.google.com or the more general google.com can often
be found in blacklist sharing platforms.
Manual processing of the shared domains is the obvious
solution to avoid blocking of essential services, yet the human
resources needed for its deployment are high. Our logging
version of the DNS firewall represents a compromise with
automatic logging of all accesses to suspicious domains. A
human administrator can periodically process these accesses,
and the top n of the domains can be manually checked and
blocked. This approach introduces a delay in reaction to new
threats but all communication is logged, and in the case of a
security incident, the victims can be traced from the firewall
log.
C. Few Open Implementations
There is currently a lack of complex RPZ implementations
that meet all the requirements for the DNS firewall, and that
would enable its use by cybersecurity teams. The DNS firewall
must consist of more parts besides the blocking itself – at
least a management interface, a logging module and a landing
page if users are to be redirected. These modules must also
be reimplemented for every new firewall, which on one hand
provides the freedom to fit them in the specific environment,
but on the other hand consumes a significant amount of time
and effort. We consider releasing our modules as an open-
source to promote DNS firewall usage and development in the
near future.
D. Easy Bypassing
Avoiding DNS-based blocking is relatively easy for the
end user, he only needs to use a different DNS server (e.g.,
Google public DNS, OpenDNS) which can be changed with
just a few clicks on Windows or by altering one line in
Linux configuration file. However, by avoiding firewall for
one blocked domain, the user also loses protection for every
other malicious domain and exposes himself to threats.
Detection of the usage of external DNS servers are nowa-
days common part of anomaly detection systems [21] and the
detection of users avoiding firewall is technically possible. It
then depends on the authority of the company if they could
order them to switch back to the DNS RPZ server.
VI. CONCLUSION
We consider the DNS firewall a suitable cybersecurity tool.
It is effective, particularly when used along with other tools
like IP blocking and automated malicious domains detection.
We have implemented the firewall based on the only available
open source technology, DNS Response Policy Zones. We
present our experience with the implementation and deploy-
ment hoping that we will help to advance the idea of the
DNS firewall as there is currently not much research being
conducted in this area.
The DNS RPZ suffers from limitations that need to be
taken into account. The most pressing issue is the inability
to directly inform users of what caused the blocking of their
communication attempt. While this does not preclude the main
purpose of the DNS firewall – blocking access to malicious
domains – obscurity does not serve well in this case. When
a website is blocked without further clarification, users tend
to try and circumvent the protection. It could also harm the
firewall operator’s trustworthiness in the long-term if websites
get often blocked by mistake.
Of the four specified requirements, our DNS firewall fulfills
completely the requirements for reliable domain blocking
and event logging. With limitations, user informing is also
possible, though only indirectly. Unfortunately, blacklist shar-
ing is restricted only to commercially provided blacklists
with no other suitable alternative. We continue researching
possibilities for better DNS firewall implementation. Despite
its shortcomings, we would prefer the DNS firewall to be based
on DNS RPZ, as it has already been in development for eight
years and provides a set of useful functions.
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